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Concerns about the social, ﬁscal, and economic consequences of population ageing have
sparked considerable interest in retirement behaviour and its determinants, resulting in an
extensive international literature examining retirement decisions. While the international
literature has provided substantial evidence of the importance of health, public pensions
and employer-provided pensions as determinants of the retirement decision (including Coile
and Gruber, 2000; Dwyer and Mitchell, 1999; Kerkhofs et al., 1999), very limited evidence is
available for Canada.1 In Canada, the retirement literature has focussed almost exclusively
on the role played by public pension programs in retirement decisions (see for example Baker
et al., 2003, 2004a). This study ﬁlls existing gaps in this literature by jointly modeling the
impact of pension incentives and health on the retirement decisions of Canadians.
A few Canadian studies have examined the role of health in the labour market decisions
of older Canadians. Magee (2002), for example, has found that poor health and work-
related disability do not have a signiﬁcant eﬀect on the probability of job separation due to
retirement. However the measurement of job separation in Magee’s study limits the extent to
which his analysis provides insight into retirement behaviour.2 In contrast, Campolieti (2002)
found that disability has a large negative eﬀect on the likelihood of labour force participation
among older men. His study, however, does not speciﬁcally address the relationship between
general health and the retirement transition, nor does it control for public pension receipt
or any other form of income in the models. More recently, Au et al. (2005) have found that
changes in health are an important determinant of employment among older Canadians,
using longitudinal data from the National Population Health Survey. This data source,
1The Canadian and international evidence is reviewed in Milligan and Schirle (2006). International
evidence is also reviewed in Feldstein and Liebman (2002); Krueger and Meyer (2002); Lumsdaine and
Mitchell (1999); Currie and Madrian (1999). Gruber and Wise (2004) present evidence on public pensions
for several countries.
2Magee (2002) uses data from the Survey of Labour and Income Dynamics (SLID), primarily responses to
the question of why the individual left their last job. Job separation due to illness or disability and retirement
are mutually exclusive responses. Those who separate from a job due to illness and simultaneously retire
may not be associated with retirement in this study.
1however, does not allow the authors to examine jointly the impacts of ﬁnancial incentives
and health on the retirement decisions of older workers. As Au et al. (2005) point out, there
may be important interactions between these two retirement determinants.3
The examination of employer-provided pensions in Canada has been limited, largely due
to a lack of appropriate data. Several authors have identiﬁed employer-provided pension
plan provisions that create incentives for individuals to enter retirement (see for example
Pesando and Gunderson, 1988, 1991; Pescarus and Rivard, 2005) and there is some evidence
suggesting that plan provisions will aﬀect older individuals’ labour supply decisions. Limited
evidence provided by Pesando et al. (1992) suggests workers will respond to incentives to
postpone retirement.4 Also, Morissette et al. (2004) have found that many retirees would
have changed their decision to retire if they had been able to reduce their work schedule
without their employer-provided pensions being aﬀected.5 Again, however, these studies do
not examine the ﬁnancial incentives for retirement jointly with the eﬀects of health.
In this paper, I ﬁll this gap in the Canadian literature using data from the Survey of
Labour and Income Dynamics (SLID) which provides measures of self-reported health status
and the information necessary to develop measures of the ﬁnancial incentives for retirement
contained in employer-provided pension plans. I use an option value framework for the
analysis of ﬁnancial incentives and exploit the longitudinal aspect of SLID to address a
variety of endogeneity issues involved in estimating the eﬀects of health status and ﬁnancial
incentives on individuals’ decisions to enter retirement.
In the next section, I provide some background to public and employer-provided pensions
3To note, although the evidence from U.S. studies may be informative for Canadians, several U.S. studies
have also found that the availability of health insurance in retirement can act as an important constraint for
the retirement decision. See for example Gruber and Madrian (1995) and Blau and Gilleskie (2001, 2003).
Given Canada’s universal health care system, these estimates may not represent the retirement response of
Canadians to changes in health status.
4 Based on monthly data from a major union pension plan in Ontario (1980-1987), workers who anticipate
an enrichment to their pension beneﬁt formula were likely to postpone retirement until the enrichment took
eﬀect.
5It is not immediately clear that employer-provided pensions will have a large behavioural eﬀect, as
Morissette and Zhang (2004) have recently shown that many individuals are not aware of whether a pension
plan is provided by their employer.
2in Canada. In the third section, I describe the theory underlying the analysis of retirement
in this paper. In the fourth section I provide the details of the empirical analysis and
present the key empirical results. The results indicate that health and the ﬁnancial incentives
in employer-provided pensions have substantial and signiﬁcant eﬀects on the retirement
decision. The ﬁnal section oﬀers some conclusions.
2 A Brief Introduction to Retirement in Canada
Canada’s retirement income system consists of several parts. First, Canada has a set of pub-
lic pension (income security) programs that provide retirement income to the elderly. The
largest component of this system involves the Canada Pension Plan and Quebec Pension
Plan (CPP/QPP), which are earnings-related pensions funded by payroll taxes on employ-
ees and employers. CPP/QPP beneﬁts are intended to replace approximately 25% of an
individuals earnings upon retirement and can be collected as early as age 60 (with an actu-
arial adjustment made to beneﬁts). In January 2007, the maximum retirement pension at
age 65 was $863.75.
The Old Age Security (OAS) pension is a uniform demogrant available to all individuals
over the age of 65 who meet residency requirements. In January 2007, the maximum OAS
beneﬁt was $491.93. There is a 15% clawback of OAS from individuals with net income
exceeding $63511. The Guaranteed Income Supplement (GIS) is an income tested beneﬁt
available to Canadians from age 65 with beneﬁt amounts depending on marital status and
family income. Finally, the Allowance (SPA) is another income-tested beneﬁt available to
60-64 year old spouses of OAS recipients and widows/widowers.
It has been clearly demonstrated by Milligan and Schirle (2006) that the structure of
Canada’s public pension system creates both incentives and disincentives for continued work
among the elderly. They ﬁnd the largest work disincentives are generated by the income test
in the GIS as it interacts with the actuarial adjustment (and other provisions of) CPP/QPP
3and with earned income to reduce the ﬁnancial return to working.
The second part of Canada’s retirement system to consider here is its employer-provided
pensions. The government provides tax assistance for savings through employer-provided
pension plans (or Registered Pension Plans) in Canada, although less than half of paid
workers are covered by a registered pension plan.6 The proportion of female paid workers
covered by pension plans remained fairly constant during the 1990s around 40%.7 For men
however, the proportion covered by pension plans dropped from 49% in 1991 to 41% in 2001.
The vast majority of employer-provided pension plans in Canada take the form of deﬁned
beneﬁt plans which provide a monthly beneﬁt that typically depends on the years a person
has spent with the employer, the wages they earn, and the individual’s age of retirement.
In 1996, 88% of pension plans in Canada were deﬁned beneﬁt plans while only 10% were
deﬁned contribution plans (for which pension beneﬁts vary depending on the contributions
accumulated for each individual and the return on investment). Over recent years a larger
proportion of plans have taken the form of deﬁned contribution plans. In 2001, 14% of
pension plans were deﬁned contribution plans.
It is also worth noting Canada’s universal health care system here, as it may play an im-
portant role in the retirement decision. Administered by each province, the system provides
universal coverage for medically necessary health care services. Private health insurance is
often used by individuals to supplement this coverage, typically important for covering the
costs of prescription medication.
3 Theoretical Considerations
There are several ways to model the retirement decision, viewed here as an individual’s
decision to permanently withdraw from labour market activities after participating in the
6Tax assistance is also available for savings through Registered Retirement Savings Plans (RRSPs). How-
ever, relatively few individuals currently at retirement ages have positive or substantial RRSP holding and
this form of savings is not considered in this study.
7The pension coverage information in this section is from Statistics Canada (2002a).
4labour force through most of his or her adult life.8 In the simplest model, individuals choose a
path of lifetime consumption and labour supply to maximize utility subject to the constraint
that the discounted present value of lifetime income equals the discounted present value of
lifetime consumption. Changes in total lifetime income are expected to have wealth eﬀects
that allow the individual to enjoy more leisure. Given hours constraints faced by many
individuals, it is expected that such wealth eﬀects will reduce the number of years that an
individual works.9
Following the work of Stock and Wise (1990), most recent modeling of the retirement
decision allows individuals to compare the expected present value of retiring immediately
(in utility terms) to the expected present value of continuing to work and holding the option
of retiring in the future. Each period, if the individual continues to work, this decision is
re-evaluated. More formally, let the expected present value of lifetime (indirect) utility for










where Uw and Ur represent the indirect utility of future income while working and while
retired respectively, ws is the wage earned at age s, Bs(r) are retirement beneﬁts at age s
that depend on the age of retirement, ys is non-labour income at age s, and Xs represents
individual characteristics. Future utility is discounted for the probability of survival to age s
given survival to age t (π(s|t)) and discounted for preferences at β = 1/(1+δ). Each period,
an individual will compare the utility of entering retirement immediately (EtVt(t)) to the
utility of entering retirement at a future optimal date (EtVt(r∗)). Placing few assumptions
on the indirect utility function, we can say an individual will choose to postpone retirement
8Several models are described in Lumsdaine and Mitchell (1999).
9Gustman and Steinmeier (1983, 1984) show that the majority of workers face hours constraints that




























where the ﬁrst term in square brackets represents the accrual of wealth possible when re-
tirement is delayed, having good health (larger Ht) implies a person is more likely to delay
retirement, and ηt represents other characteristics important for the retirement decision.10
This simple structural model underlies the econometric model used to estimate the eﬀects
of health and pensions on the retirement decision.
4 Empirical Analysis
The objective is to estimate a simple probit model for the decision to enter retirement
as it relates to the individuals’ health, wealth, and the accrual of wealth associated with
employer-provided pensions. That is, I want to estimate the reduced form model
R
∗
it = β0 + β1Hit + β2Wit + β3ACCit + β4Xit + it (3)
where individual i enters retirement at time t (Rit = 1) if the latent variable R∗
it > 0,
indicating that the expected present value of entering retirement (in utility terms) is greater
than the expected present value of continuing to work. Rit = 0 if the individual continues
to work. This retirement decision depends on the individual’s health status (Hit), pension
wealth (Wit) and the accrual in pension wealth (ACCit) that could be achieved if retirement
10Here, I am assuming individual characteristics such as health (Hs) act as preference shifters in the utility
function (which are additively separable from utility gained from income sources) that follow a ﬁrst order
autoregressive process, and I place a linear utility function over income. δACC, γH, and λ represent the
weights placed on wealth, health and other characteristics in the utility function.
6were delayed, as well as other characteristics (Xit) we might consider important in the
retirement decision.
4.1 Data, Measurement and Identiﬁcation Issues
To estimate the model I am using data from the Survey of Labour and Income Dynamics
(SLID). SLID is a longitudinal survey following individuals over the course of 6 years. In
this study, samples are drawn from three of the existing panels. Speciﬁcally, from each year
1996-2001, I take a sample of individuals who spent at least part of that year in the labour
force, are age 50-68 and are ﬂagged as paid workers during the year.11 I exclude individuals
whose labour force status or health information is missing. At a minimum, I need to observe
an individual’s labour force status for two consecutive years in order to judge their retirement
status. Since the questions regarding health status are not asked until 1996, earlier years
of the survey cannot be used here.12 The panel aspect of this survey is heavily relied on to
deﬁne and identify the eﬀects of the key covariates, further discussed below.
The deﬁnition of retirement used in this study is meant to capture individuals who depart
from and remain out of the labour force. Using the data available in SLID, a person is deﬁned
as entering retirement during the observation year if they were in the labour force for at least
part of the observation year and then not at all in the labour force in the following year. A
person is deﬁned as not entering retirement if they continued in the labour force the following
year.13 This deﬁnition of retirement results in an expected retirement hazard, presented in
Figure 1.
The retirement hazard presented here represents the probability of entering retirement
at each age, given that the individual was in the labour force at that age. Small spikes in the
11To note, a self-employed worker will still be included in the sample if they also held a paid worker job
during the year. The exclusion made here allows me to keep individuals for whom self-employment is a
secondary activity. The results are robust to further exclusion of all self-employed individuals.
12The ﬁrst panel of SLID began in 1993, the second began in 1996. Thus, the 1996 sample will include
people in both panels.
13For a recent discussion of how we can deﬁne the concept of retirement see Bowlby (2007). The deﬁnition
of retirement used here is fairly robust. For example, I have tried using and absence of earned income to

















































Figure 1: Conditional Probability of Retirement at Diﬀerent Ages
Note: This is the probability of entering retirement at each age given participation in the
labour force at that age. The sample is described in the text.
hazard occur at age 55 (when many employer-provided pension plans allow early retirement)
and at age 60 (when individuals are ﬁrst eligible for CPP/QPP). A large spike occurs at age
65 when individuals become eligible for several public pension beneﬁts and may be subject
to mandatory retirement. Very few individuals who retire (according to this deﬁnition) are
likely to return to the labour force (ie. exit retirement). Using the full panel aspect of SLID
to investigate this, I found that only 5% of retirees age 60-64 exit retirement within 2 years
and less than 10% of individuals aged 60-64 exit within four years. Re-entry to the labour
force, however, is a more likely event for those under 55.14
The measurement of health relies on individuals’ self-reported health status. In estimat-
ing the reduced form model above, I explore a variety of health measures in order to address
several of the problems associated with measuring and identifying the eﬀects of health on
retirement. As a baseline, I begin by using an indicator for poor health, based on individuals’
1445% of retired individuals age 50-54 spent at least some time in the labour force (employed or unem-
ployed) in the following 4 years.
8Table 1: Self-reported health status and disability
Age 50-54 55-59 60-64 65-68
Current Health
Poor 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.02
Fair 0.07 0.10 0.10 0.11
Good 0.26 0.29 0.26 0.27
Very Good 0.40 0.35 0.39 0.38
Excellent 0.25 0.24 0.23 0.22
Past Health
Poor 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.02
Fair 0.07 0.10 0.09 0.10
Good 0.24 0.28 0.24 0.25
Very Good 0.41 0.37 0.40 0.37
Excellent 0.28 0.24 0.25 0.26
Changes in Health
New Disability 0.09 0.10 0.12 0.14
Small Shock 0.28 0.28 0.29 0.29
Large Shock 0.05 0.07 0.07 0.09
Note: Proportions reporting each category of health reported. Sample
is described in text, includes 25810 observations. For past health infor-
mation, only 17618 observations are available. See text for deﬁnitions of
variables.
self-reported current health status (summarized in Table 1). The ﬁrst identiﬁcation problem
lies in the fact that measurement error is likely and will place a downward (attenuation)
bias on any estimated eﬀect of poor health. On one hand, this problem arises because this
is not an objective measure of health. Baker et al. (2004b), however, have found evidence
of measurement error in self-reported objective measures of health, including reports of can-
cer. Another problem, therefore, is simply that the measure of health is self-reported. I am
unable to correct for this type of error given the limited health information in this survey.
The second identiﬁcation problem is referred to as justiﬁcation bias - a situation where
people will rationalize their retirement by reporting poor health. This is expected to place
an upward bias on the estimated eﬀect of poor health. Whether this bias will be signiﬁcant
is not clear. Au et al. (2005) present evidence suggesting that self-assessed health measures
suﬀer from attenuation bias rather than justiﬁcation bias. Other studies, such as that by
Dwyer and Mitchell (1999), ﬁnd no evidence of justiﬁcation bias. Finally, a third source of
9bias works in the opposite direction. There exists some evidence that health improves after
retirement, particularly among blue collar workers (Marshall and Clarke, 1998).
I have tackled these last two endogeneity problems by taking advantage of the longitudinal
aspect of SLID. The key problem with the health measure is that respondents are interviewed
in January following the survey year about their current (and potentially post-retirement)
health. To address this, I use several speciﬁcations that rely on past reports of health,
eﬀectively representing the individual’s health at the beginning of the observation year in
which the retirement decision is made.
Making use of past health reports, however, will miss events that happen during the year
to worsen a person’s health and push them into retirement. With this in mind, I also provide
speciﬁcations that use health measures reﬂecting a change in health status. As summarized
in Table 1, I create a measure reﬂecting whether a person reports not having a disability
at the beginning of the year, but reports having a disability at the end of the year (new
disability) and measures for small shocks and large shocks to an individual’s health.15
The measurement of the ﬁnancial incentives variables - wealth and the accrual of wealth
associated with pensions - is quite involved. Essentially, I use information available in SLID
to obtain estimates of the ﬁnancial components of equation (2). Here, I allow individuals to
live up to age 102 (T) and retire up to age 69 (r). A discount rate of 3% is used (β = 0.97) and
the survival probabilities (π) are based on Statistics Canada’s sex-speciﬁc lifetables (Statis-
tics Canada, 2002b). The wealth measure then represents the expected present discounted
value of lifetime income if a person retired immediately (ie.
PT
s=t βs−tπ(s|t)[ys + Bs(t)]).
There are two components to the pension beneﬁts (Bs) included here - public pensions and
employer-provided pensions - neither of which are directly observable. For public pensions,
I determine the initial beneﬁt an individual would be eligible for from CPP/QPP, OAS, GIS
and SPA given a speciﬁc retirement age and the policy rules in place in the observation year.
15A small shock measures any worsening of reported health status and large shock measures a worsening
of health from excellent, very good, or good to fair or poor.
10The initial beneﬁt is then indexed to expected inﬂation.16
For employer-provided pensions, I have eﬀectively developed an average potential pension
formula to estimate the future pensions of individuals who report having access to employer-
provided pension beneﬁts. Here, I estimate the pension amount a person would initially
receive upon retirement based on the individuals age, job tenure, union status, public or
private sector status, occupation, wage and size of employer. The estimates are obtained
using a standard Heckman selection model, accounting for the fact that I am unable to
observe the potential pension amounts for individuals who choose not to retire.17 As with
the public pension amount, the initial pension amount is then assumed to increase with
expected rates of inﬂation. As reﬂected in Table 2, the projections of future incomes that I
construct here approximate the actual distributions of each source of income fairly well. The
distributions of resulting wealth and peak accrual measures are provided in the appendix.
Problems arise in estimating the eﬀects of pension incentives on the decision to retire
because the variation in pensions is partly based on individual variation in work histories.
The variation we see in work histories may capture individual heterogeneity in preferences for
leisure and work. For example, we would expect that individuals with a higher preference for
work will also have longer and more complete work histories, and potentially higher wealth
and accrual measures. If this heterogeneity is not controlled for, the estimated eﬀects of
wealth and accruals may be biased downward.
I take two approaches to controlling for this type of heterogeneity. First, I provide
16An example program for constructing public pension wealth is available from the author upon request.
Expected inﬂation rates used here follow the expected inﬂation rates used in the CPP/QPP Actuarial
Reports. Public pensions require the construction of a wage history for each individual. This is is constructed
by using the Survey of Consumer Finances and SLID to obtain sex-speciﬁc annual wage regression estimates
and imputing a wage history from 1973 to the observation year. Covariates include experience, education,
province, and marital status. Simple projections are used for previous years. The reported years of full
time full year experience is used to determine the appropriate length of the wage history. Income testing
for GIS and SPA amounts account for investment income, which is imputed by matching individuals in my
sample to individuals in the Census ﬁles and assigning investment income as the cell-speciﬁc expected median
investment income, (PRob(I > 0)∗
c(Median|I > 0)c). Cells were based on labour force status, region, age
group, marital status, sex, and occupation.
17The selection equation is a retirement probit, with instruments including indicators for health status,
marital status, whether a spouse is in the labour force, the number of children in the census family, and
non-linear functions of tenure and wages.
11Table 2: The Distribution of Imputed and Actual Incomes
Mean Median 1st Dec. 9th Dec. Std. Dev
d Waget, (Rt = 0) 32284 25313 8890 65431 24292
Waget, (Rt = 0) 37331 32215 7000 68350 39121
d CPP t+1, (Rt = 1,Aget+1 ≥ 60) 5568 6060 1443 8876 2693
CPPt+1, (Rt = 1,Aget+1 ≥ 60) 4809 5238 0 8637 3234
d OASt+1, (Rt = 1,Aget+1 ≥ 65) 4776 5049 3660 5232 839
OASt+1, (Rt = 1,Aget+1 ≥ 65) 4209 4901 1286 5232 1588
d GISt+1, (Rt = 1,Aget+1 ≥ 65) 451 0 0 0 1138
GISt+1, (Rt = 1,Aget+1 ≥ 65) 878 0 0 3504 1618
d Pensiont+1, (Rt = 1)a 9533 6870 0 24898 10189
Pensiont+1, (Rt = 1) 9982 0 0 33956 14551
d Pensiont+1, (Rt = 1,Aget+1 ≥ 60) 8880 6870 0 22501 9318
Pensiont+1, (Rt = 1,Aget+1 ≥ 60) 9266 2374 0 31212 12956
d Investmentt, (Rt = 1) 909 920 467 1370 338
Investmentt, (Rt = 1) 1494 8 0 3848 7064
Note: Sample is described in text. Imputed incomes are denoted with b. Rt = 1 indicates the individual entered
retirement during the year t.
a Imputed pensions are zero below the 40th percentile among those who retired.
speciﬁcations of the retirement probit that include control variables for lifetime earnings, ex-
perience, and current wages, as these variables should proxy for the heterogeneity in leisure
preferences.18 Second, I use a ﬁxed eﬀects probit estimator to deal directly with the individ-
ual unobserved heterogeneity.
In all the speciﬁcations presented in the next section I include a set of indicators for
age, province, sex, marital status, whether a spouse continues to work or enters retirement,
whether a spouse has poor health, and the number of children in the census family under
the age of 18 as basic set of covariates.19
18Baker et al. (2003) use similar earnings controls to address this identiﬁcation problem. Estimates of life-
time earnings are based on the same information used in individuals work histories constructed for CPP/QPP
estimates. Experience is measured as the number of years of full time full year experience, reported in SLID.
A cubic in lifetime earnings and wages and a cubic in spouse’s earnings and wages is used.
19Obviously, time invariant covariates are dropped from the individual ﬁxed eﬀects speciﬁcations.
12Table 3: Retirement Probit Results I (Marginal Eﬀectsa)
Probit Probit F.E.
Poor Health 0.239 *** 0.250 *** 0.154 *
(.040) (.040) (.101)
Pension Wealth 0.018 *** 0.019 *** 0.083 ***
($10000 increase) (.003) (.003) (.019)
Peak accrual -0.015 ** -0.018 ** -0.096 *
($10000 increase) (.007) (.008) (.056)
Lifetime earnings yes no no
Experience no yes no
Wages yes yes no
Notes: ***, **, and * indicate coeﬃcients are statistically signiﬁcant at teh 1%, 5%,
and 10% level, respectively. Sample is described in the text. The retirement probits use
25810 observations. For the ﬁxed eﬀects estimator, only 3195 observations (represent-
ing 1131 individuals) are available. See text for deﬁnitions of variables. Speciﬁcations
include the basic set of covariates.
a Marginal eﬀects are representing a 60 year old single male in Ontario. Standard
errors are in parentheses.
4.2 Results
The results of the various retirement probits discussed above are presented in Tables 3 and 4.
As expected, pension wealth has a positive and signiﬁcant eﬀect on an individual’s likelihood
of entering retirement. The results in the ﬁrst column of Table 3 indicate that a $10,000
increase in pension wealth increases the likelihood of entering retirement by 1.8 percentage
points. Given the sample retirement rate is 7%, this implies a very substantial increase in
the retirement rate by 25%. When the individual ﬁxed eﬀects estimator is used to control
any bias associated with individual preferences for leisure, the estimated marginal eﬀect of
pension wealth is actually the same. Although the marginal eﬀect appears much larger, the
data restrictions required here to use the ﬁxed eﬀects estimator result in a sample retirement
rate of 33% so that a $10000 increase in pension wealth implies an increase in the retirement
rate of 25%. This would suggest that the use of lifetime earnings and experience measures
are adequate to control for this type of bias.
The accrual of wealth also has a signiﬁcant and substantial impact on the likelihood
of retirement, with estimates indicating that the retirement rate would decrease by 25% if
individuals were given an additional $10000 to delay retirement for at least one year. This
13estimate is fairly consistent across speciﬁcations. It is interesting to note that the results
presented here are driven by the variation in employer-provided pensions rather than public
pensions. Speciﬁcations using only public pensions in the measures of wealth and accrual
often result in insigniﬁcant estimates.20 Speciﬁcations using only employer-provided pensions
result in very similar estimates to those presented here.21
Table 4: Retirement Probit Results II (Marginal Eﬀectsa)
1 2 3 4 5 6
Past health status no yes yes – – –
Poor 0.273 *** 0.245 *** 0.266 *** – – –
(.041) (.056) (.057)
Fair 0.091 *** – 0.057 *** – – –
(.018) (.019)
Good 0.023 *** – 0.045 *** – – –
(.009) (.013)
Very Good 0.011 – 0.008 – – –
(.008) (.010)
Change in Health
New Disability – – – 0.094 *** – –
(.016)
Small Shock – – – – 0.021 ** –
(.010)
Large Shock – – – – – 0.082 ***
(.023)
Pension Wealth 0.017 *** 0.022 *** 0.020 *** 0.018 *** 0.022 *** 0.022 ***
(.003) (.004) (.004) (.003) (.004) (.004)
Peak Accrual -0.015 ** -0.018 * -0.016 -0.020 *** -0.019 * -0.019 *
(.007) (.011) (.010) (.008) (.011) (.011)
Notes: ***, **, and * indicate coeﬃcients are statistically signiﬁcant at teh 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
Sample is described in the text. The probit in column 1 uses 25810 observations, and the retirement probits in
columns 2-6 use 17618 observations. See text for deﬁnitions of variables. Speciﬁcations include the basic set of
covariates and controls for experience and wages.
a Marginal eﬀects are representing a 60 year old single male in Ontario. Standard errors are in parentheses.
The results in Tables 3 and 4 also consistently demonstrate that health status has a
signiﬁcant eﬀect on the likelihood of retirement. The eﬀect is substantial, as estimates in
20Note there are only minor changes to public pensions over the period studied here, resulting in limited
exogenous variation in this variable. See the results reported in the appendix.
21When public pension amounts are left out of the wealth measure the marginal eﬀect of wealth is 0.018
and accrual is -0.013 (which should be compared to the estimate in the ﬁrst column of Table 3). Also,
including an indicator variable for access to an employer-provided pension as a covariate does not change
these results. Furthermore, including other forms of income such as projected investment or wage income
and tax payable does not substantially change the results.
14the ﬁrst column of Table 3 imply that having poor health raises the likelihood of entering
retirement by 24 percentage points. The results presented in Table 4 make use of the various
measures of health to check the robustness of this result in light of the various identiﬁcation
issues involved in estimating the eﬀect of health.22 The speciﬁcation presented in the ﬁrst
column makes use of all categories of current health. Not surprisingly, having fair (relative
to excellent) health also has a substantial eﬀect on the likelihood of retirement, although not
nearly as large as having poor health.
The next two columns address the concern that justiﬁcation bias creates an upward bias in
the estimated eﬀect of health. The resulting estimated eﬀect of health is only slightly smaller
when using the individuals’ report of health at the beginning of year (past health), lending
support to the conclusions of Au et al. (2005) that justiﬁcation bias is fairly small. The
smaller estimates may reﬂect the importance of changes in health that may occur throughout
the year, as evidenced by the estimates presented in remaining columns. Here, the onset of
a new disability raises the likelihood of entering retirement by more than nine percentage
points and a large health shock has a comparable eﬀect.
The models presented here are unable to address any measurement error in self-assessed
health. The results, however, further support the conclusions of Au et al. (2005) as they sug-
gest that attenuation bias is a large problem. As they point out in their paper, measurement
error problems can be exacerbated by allowing for ﬁxed eﬀects, as I have in Table 3. The
ﬁxed eﬀects estimate of the eﬀect of poor health is obviously much smaller than the probit
estimates. The eﬀect remains positive and signiﬁcant, however, attesting to the robustness
of this result.
Although not presented here, it is interesting to note that speciﬁcations of the probit
model that included indicators for access to health, life, and disability insurance through
an employer, as well as interaction terms for poor health and access to insurance were
also estimated to check whether these factors might act as a constraint on retirement as it
22The results in this table are are most comparable to those in the second column of Table 3.
15appears to in the United States. Not surprisingly, the eﬀects of insurance on the likelihood
of retirement appear insigniﬁcant in the Canadian context. Furthermore, the eﬀects of poor
health did not diﬀer between individuals with and without health or disability insurance.
Finally, the results presented in Tables 3 and 4 suggest that there are not important
interactions between health and pension incentives that would lead to omitted variables
bias. Here, the estimated eﬀects of pension wealth and accrual are not particularly sensitive
to the choice of health measure used. Furthermore, several speciﬁcations of the retirement
probit that included interaction terms for poor health and pension wealth were estimated
and these coeﬃcients were not at all signiﬁcant.
5 Conclusions
Faced with an ageing population, governments in several developed countries have expressed
a desire to alter the structure of retirement and encourage the participation of older indi-
viduals in the labour force.23 A necessary ﬁrst step in any policy development is to acquire
a solid understanding of the determinants of the retirement decision.
This paper ﬁlls an existing gap in the Canadian literature (noted by Au et al., 2005) by
jointly modeling and estimating the role played by health and employer-provided pensions in
the retirement decision. The results demonstrate that health is a substantial and signiﬁcant
determinant of the retirement decision, as having poor health will increase the likelihood
of entering retirement by roughly 25 percentage points. This is likely an underestimate
of the eﬀect of poor health, given the lack of evidence for justiﬁcation bias and evidence
supporting attenuation bias. The results also indicate that the ﬁnancial incentives built into
most employer-provided pension plans play an important role in the timing of retirement.
The analysis makes a more general contribution to the international retirement literature
in two ways. First, the ﬁndings add to the evidence provided in papers such as Au et al.
23See for example, recent on-line documents from the Canadian government at http://www.fin.gc.ca/
ec2006/plan/plc3e.html.
16(2005), Dwyer and Mitchell (1999), and Coile and Gruber (2000) that the identiﬁcation of
health eﬀects in retirement models can be problematic. Second, the analysis supports the
results of several US and European studies such as Kerkhofs et al. (1999) that demonstrate
the importance of health and pensions in retirement decisions.
Finally, these results potentially have important implications for the reform of public
pension and employer-provided pension policies in Canada. Primarily, changes to the struc-
ture of beneﬁt formulas or tax policies that aﬀect accruals in pension wealth may inﬂuence
the timing of retirement. Further, it important to consider that the importance of health
may trump the eﬀects of ﬁnancial incentives found in any pension scheme.
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196 Appendix
Table 5: Retirement Probit Results III (Marginal Eﬀectsa)
(Using only Public Pensions)
Probit Probit F.E.
Poor Health 0.247 *** 0.249 *** 0.160 **
(.039) (.039) (.096)
Pension Wealth 0.024 0.020 0.343 *
($10000 increase) (.022) (.020) (.181)
Peak accrual -0.155 ** -0.186 *** -0.282
($10000 increase) (.076) (.069) (.367)
Lifetime earnings yes no no
Experience no yes no
Wages yes yes no
Notes: ***, **, and * indicate coeﬃcients are statistically signiﬁcant at the
1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. Sample is described in the text. The
retirement probits use 25810 observations. For the ﬁxed eﬀects estimator, only
3195 observations (representing 1131 individuals) are available. See text for
deﬁnitions of variables. Speciﬁcations include the basic set of covariates.
a Marginal eﬀects are representing a 60 year old single male in Ontario. Stan-
dard errors are in parentheses.
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